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In Determining the Criminal Liability of a Parent,
Neither the Maturity of an Unemancipated Minor
nor the Minor's Right to Privacy are Affimnative
Defenses to Discharge Parental Duties to their
Minor Children in Life Threatening Situations:
Commonwealth v. Nixon
CRIMINAL LAw - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - MATURE MINOR DOCTRINE -
THE PARENTAL DUTY OF CARE - The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
held that the mature minor doctrine will not be employed in the
Commonwealth as an affirmative criminal defense discharging
parents from the duty to provide care to a minor in their custody.
Commonwealth v. Nixon, 761 A.2d 1151 (Pa. 2000)
In June 1997, Shannon Nixon ("Shannon") became ill, fell into a
comatose state, and ultimately died from complications related to
the onset of diabetes acidosis.' At the time of her death, Shannon
was sixteen years old.2 Shannon's parents, Dennis E. and Lorie A.
Nixon ("Nixons"), were aware of their daughter's deteriorating
condition prior to her death.3 Throughout their child's illness, the
Nixons had Shannon "anointed"4 at their place of worship and
prayed for her recovery, but did not seek medical attention for
their daughter's illness.5
Dennis and Lorie Nixon were subsequently charged with
involuntary manslaughter and endangering the welfare of a child.6
1. Commonwealth v. Nixon, 718 A.2d 312 (Pa. 1998) ("Nixon I"). Diabetes acidosis is
defined as the "excessive acidity of body fluids due to an accumulation of ketone bodies
occurring in advanced stages of uncontrolled diabetes mellitus." TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 26 (16th ed. 1985).
2. Commonwealth v. Nixon, 761 A.2d 1152 (Pa. 2000) ("Nixon '").
3. Id. at 1152.
4. Anointing of the sick is defined as the "sacrament of anointing a critically ill person,
praying for recovery, and asking for the absolution of sin." WEBSTER'S H NEW COLLEGE
DICTIONARY 46-47 (1995).
5. Nixon II, 761 A.2d at 1152. The Nixons and their children were members of the
Faith Thbernacle Church, a religion that addresses illness through spiritual treatment rather
than by conventional medical treatment. Id.
6. Id. at 1152-53. The statute for involuntary manslaughter reads:
General rule - A person is guilty of involuntary manslaughter when as a direct result
of the doing of an unlawful act in a reckless or grossly negligent manner, or the doing
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The defendant parents argued that Shannon was mature enough to
make her own decisions regarding her health care and religious
beliefs, thus negating their parental duty to provide her with
medical care.7  The trial court held that the parental duty of
providing medical care was not abrogated, and Dennis and Lorie
Nixon were convicted of both offenses charged.
8
On appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, the Nixons again
contended that their parental duty to provide medical treatment
was discharged because: (1) Shannon should be categorized as a
"mature minor,"9 and as such, had an ability to refuse medical
treatment; and (2) pursuant to her right of privacy guaranteed by
the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions, Shannon had a
right to refuse medical treatment.10 In addressing both of the
appellants' issues together, the superior court held that neither
Shannon's right to privacy nor her status as a mature minor
discharged her parents' affirmative duty to override her decision
when her life was in immediate danger." Therefore, the
Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the order and judgment of
sentence of the court of common pleas.'2
of a lawful act in a reckless or grossly negligent manner, he causes the death of
another person.
18 PaC.S. § 2504(a)(1998). Pennsylvania's statute regarding endangering the welfare of
children states:
Offense defined - A parent, guardian, or other person supervising the welfare of a
child under 18 years of age commits an offense if he knowingly endangers the welfare
of the child by violating a duty of care, protection or support.
18 PaC.S. § 4304(a)(2000).
7. Nixon I, 718 A.2d at 313. Dennis and Lorie Nixon argued that Shannon had a right
to refuse medical treatment pursuant to her constitutional right to privacy, which would
eliminate the parents' duty to provide treatment. Id. The Nixons additionally asserted that
Shannon's ability to refuse medical treatment as a mature minor abrogated the parental duty
of care. Id.
8. Id. The Court of Common Pleas of Blair County held that the Nixons had a duty to
Shannon, their minor child, to override her religious beliefs and obtain medical treatment
when her condition became life threatening. Id.
9. Id. A minor is defined as "an infant or person who is under the age of legal
competence .... In most states, a person is no longer a minor after reaching the age of 18
. . . ." BIACK's LAw DICTIONARY 689 (61h ed. 1990). For a definition of the mature minor
doctrine, see infra note 17.
10. Nixon 1, 718 A.2d at 312. The Nixons raised other issues on appeal, including: (1)
that their prosecution violated the notice requirements of due process where spiritual
treatment is authorized by statute; (2) that the trial court erred in failing to deliver a mistake
of fact charge to the jury; and (3) that the trial court improperly imposed an excessive
sentence. Id. These arguments were dismissed by the Pennsylvania Superior Court and not
raised at the subsequent appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Id. at 315-16.
11. Id. at 313.
12. Id. at 312.
2001 Commonwealth v. Nixon
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur13 to consider
two issues: (1) whether a mature minor doctrine should be adopted
in the Commonwealth as an affirmative defense to the parental
duty to provide care for a minor; and (2) whether Shannon Nixon
had a right to refuse medical treatment pursuant to her privacy
rights under the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions.' 4
Justice Zappala, writing for the majority,' 5 affirmed the orders of
both the superior court and the court of common pleas, and upheld
the convictions of involuntary manslaughter and endangering the
welfare of a child against both Dennis and Lorie Nixon. 16
Justice Zappala first confirmed that a mature minor doctrine 7
would not be adopted as a criminal defense within Pennsylvania. 8
Second, the majority found that Shannon Nixon's constitutional
right to privacy did not relieve her parents from fulfilling their
statutory duty to provide her with care.' 9
In analyzing the mature minor doctrine as a possible affirmative
defense to the charge of endangering the welfare of children,
Justice Zappala conceded that if the appellants could avoid the
affirmative, statutory duty imposed on them, the convictions of the
appellants could not stand.20 The court's opinion recognized that
the Commonwealth has a duty to care for individuals who are
legally incapacitated, which arises under the sovereign's duty of
13. Alocatur is defined as "the allowance of a writ or order." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY
49 (6"h ed. 1990).
14. Nixon II, 761 A.2d at 1152. Although not explicitly specified in either, personal
privacy rights are guaranteed by both the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions,
resulting from the "penumbra of articulated rights." Id. at 1156. In Pennsylvania, the personal
privacy right is understood to be "the right to left alone." Id.
15. The majority consisted of Chief Justice Flaherty, and Justices Zappala, Castille,
Nigro, Newman, and Saylor. Id. at 1151. Justice Cappy filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 1157.
16. Id.
17. Id at 1153. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court accepted the appellants' definition of
the mature minor doctrine as held in a Tennessee decision, CardweU v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d
739, 748 (Tenn. 1987). The Tennessee court indicated that the determination of whether a
minor has the capacity to consent to medical treatment depends upon age, ability,
experience, education, training, and degree of maturity or judgment as obtained by the
minor, as well as upon the conduct and demeanor of the minor at the time of the incident
involved. CardweU, 724 S.W.2d at 748. Furthermore, the totality of the circumstances, nature
of the treatment, risks, and probable consequences, and the minor's ability to appreciate the
risk and consequences are to be considered in the determination of whether a minor has the
capacity to consent to medical treatment. Id. The application of a mature minor doctrine has
been utilized in other states as well as Tennessee. Nixon II, 761 A.2d at 1154.
18. Id. at 1155.
19. Nixon II, 761 A.2d at 1152.
20. Id. at 1153.
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parens patriae.21 The majority also identified that the Pennsylvania
legislature has placed the primary responsibility for the well-being
of children upon their parents, and as such, has partially fulfilled
its sovereign duty.22 Furthermore, Justice Zappala conveyed that the
Pennsylvania legislature has provided authority for identifying
minors who are deemed sufficiently mature to give consent to, and
correspondingly to refuse, medical treatment2 Admittedly, the
court recognized that the legislature has created several exceptions
to the general rule for incapacity, but recognized that in no
instances have these statutory exceptions indicated a legislative
intent to grant a minor the capacity to either consent to or refuse
medical treatment in a life-threatening situation.24 In conclusion, the
majority ruled that the maturity of an unemancipated minor 5 is not
an affirmative defense applicable to the charges brought against the
Nixons.
26
The appellants' second argument, that their parental duty to
provide medical care was discharged by Shannon Nixon's
constitutional privacy interests, was analyzed in relation to the
Pennsylvania Constitution rather than the United States
Constitution, as the right of privacy is afforded greater protection
by the Pennsylvania Constitution.27 To pass constitutional muster in
Pennsylvania, the state's interest in any legislation diminishing a
citizen's right to privacy must be compelling in relation to the
21. Id. Parens patriae refers to "the principle that a state must care for those who
cannot take care of themselves, such as minors who lack proper care and custody from their
parents." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 769 (6"h ed. 1990).
22. Nixon II, 761 A.2d at 1153.
23. Id. at 1155. "Any minor who is eighteen years of age or older, or has graduated
from high school, or has married, or has been pregnant, may give effective consent to
medical, dental, and health services for himself or herself, and the consent of no other
person shall be necessary." Act of Feb. 13, 1970, PL. 19, No. 10, §1, 35 P.S.§10101.
24. Nixon II, 761 A.2d at 1155.
25. An unemancipated minor refers to a person under eighteen years of age who is not
totally self-supporting. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 360 (6"h ed. 1990). There was no indication in
appellants' argument or record that Shannon Nixon was emancipated. Nixon II, 761 A.2d at
1154. Shannon Nixon lived in appellants' home and did not assert her independence from her
parents in any manner that could render her emancipated. Id.
26. Nixon II, 761 A.2d at 1155.
27. Id. at 1156. Although both the U.S. and Pennsylvania Constitutions offer protections
of personal privacy, the court elected to utilize the constitutional test applicable under the
Pennsylvania Constitution to determine if Shannon Nixon's privacy interest was violated. Id.
The federal constitutional approach to determine whether a violation of privacy has occurred
employs a flexible balancing approach, which causes increasing levels of scrutiny to be
applied to corresponding increased levels of intrusion. Id. The Pennsylvania Constitution
does not allow for any flexibility, but applies a "strict scrutiny" test in which only a
compelling state interest can override one's privacy rights. Id. See supra note 14.
Vol. 40:147
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privacy right affected. 28 The majority deemed the state's interest in
the welfare of unemancipated minor children to be compelling.29
Additionally, the court noted that imposing a duty on parents to
provide care to a minor in their custody was an appropriate subject
for legislation.3 Therefore, the court concluded that Pennsylvania's
compelling interest in preserving the welfare of minor children
overrides an individual's privacy rights, and, consequently, the
parental duty of the appellants to seek medical attention for
Shannon was not negated by her right to privacy.31 Accordingly,
Pennsylvania will not employ a mature minor doctrine as an
affirmative criminal defense, and the majority affirmed the
convictions of the appellants.
3 2
Justice Cappy, although agreeing with the result of the majority's
decision, wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he accepted
the mature minor doctrine.33 Justice Cappy concurred with the
majority's result by determining that Shannon did not have the
maturity to make an informed decision regarding medical
treatment.34 However, criticizing the majority's analysis, Justice
Cappy indicated his belief that legislative intent should not have
played such a decisive role in the outcome of the case.3 Although
the end result in this case would remain unchanged, Justice Cappy
suggested that the court should be guided, not directed, by
legislative intent.
36
Furthermore, Justice Cappy identified two broad categories of
exceptions under the rule of minor incapacity; those premised on
the child's specific medical condition that ought to be treated, and
those that focus on a minor's status.37 Regarding the exceptions
28. Id. See supra note 27.
29. Id. The court indicated that a compelling state interest in the welfare of minors
could impinge upon the constitutional rights of both minors and adults simultaneously. Id.
30. Id.
31. Nixon II, 761 A.2d at 1156.
32. Id.
33. Id. (Cappy, J., concurring).
34. Id. (Cappy, J., concurring). Justice Cappy made this determination based on a
review of the record. Id.
35. Id. at 1158. Justice Cappy characterized the majority's refusal to accept the mature
minor doctrine as based on the legislature's express and exclusive enactment of statutory
exceptions to the general rule of parental consent. Id.
36. Nixon II, 761 A-2d. at 1158 (Cappy, J., concurring). Commenting on the impropriety
of allowing legislative action to have a dispositive role in the assessment of the mature
minor doctrine, Justice Cappy remarked that the court should not be directed by legislative
intent except in instances where the legislature has established a comprehensive statutory
scheme aimed at occupying an entire area of the law. Id.
37. Id. at 1158.
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related to a minor's status, the Pennsylvania legislature has
ascertained specific occurrences that are indicative of a person's
capacity to make his or her own medical decisions.38 In reference
to a minor's right to consent to or refuse medical treatment, Justice
Cappy remarked that a minor should be entitled to make this
decision, provided that he has demonstrated the capacity: (1) to
understand the nature of his condition; (2) to appreciate the gravity
of the choices he makes; and (3) to responsibly reach a decision
regarding medical intervention.3 9 Justice Cappy suggested that the
court should adopt the mature minor doctrine to allow minors who
meet this standard to make their own medical decisions.
40
A concept that originated from English common law, the parens
patriae doctrine confers power on the state to protect the health
and welfare of its citizens.41 An extension of this power is the right
of the state to protect its citizen children.42 Following the rationale
of the United States Supreme Court in Prince v. Massachusetts,43
the Nixon court agreed that the rights of parenthood and religion
will occasionally yield to the state's parens patriae power.44
In a case of first impression, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
in Nixon, to determine whether Pennsylvania should adopt the
mature minor doctrine, first identified the affirmative duty upon
parents and guardians to care for their children.45 Realizing that
accompanying this parental duty is also the right to raise the child
38. Id. (Cappy, J., concurring). Justice Cappy identified examples of such occurrences,
for instance: minors turning the age of eighteen, marrying, becoming a parent, or graduating
from high school. Id. These statutory exceptions allow minors to make medical decisions of
their own. Id. See supra note 23.
39. Id.
40. Id. Justice Cappy's analysis of the record indicated that Shannon Nixon fell short of
the standard. Id. Accordingly, Justice Cappy concurred with the majority's result in
upholding the convictions of the appellants. Id. at 1158 (Cappy, J., concurring). Justice
Cappy did not express any opinion on the privacy issue raised under the Pennsylvania and
United States Constitutions. Id.
41. Parens patriae, in English common law, conveyed the perception of the King as
the "guardian to persons with legal disabilities such as infants, idiots and lunatics." BLACK'S
LAW DITIONARY 1003 (5C ed. 1979).
42. "The state has a paramount interest in the welfare of children which may justify
intervention to control or supersede the rights of parents when necessary for the protection
of children." 67A C.J.S. Parent & Child §15 (1978).
43. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
44. Nixon II, 761 A.2d at 1153. The court quoted the U.S. Supreme Court's analysis in
Prince that neither the rights of liberty nor of parenthood are beyond the reach of state
intervention. Id. Furthermore, in acting as parens patriae, the state can restrict parents'
control over their children in various ways, including requiring school attendance and the




with minimal state encroachment, the court cited Prince46 to
reiterate that the rights of religion and parenthood are subject to
limitation.47 The right to practice religion freely does not include
the liberty to expose the community to communicable disease or a
child to ill health or death.48
The court concluded that applying the mature minor doctrine in
the context of health care decisions would release parents from
their affirmative duty to care for their children.49 In considering the
Nixons' petition for an exception to the parental duty, the majority
analyzed the application of the mature minor doctrine in cases
decided by other states.5°
In CardweU v. Bechtol,51 the Supreme Court of Tennessee
confronted issues concerning the ability and capacity of a mature
minor to consent to receive medical treatment. 52 The plaintiff
parents in CardweU argued that parental consent was required for
a physician to render medical treatment to a minor, and the failure
to obtain such consent would constitute a battery on the child.3
The Tennessee court examined the state's statutory policy to assist
it in deciding whether the mature minor exception should be a
viable defense, or rather, whether policy requires a strict view of
the common law, which does not consider the minor's maturity nor
the circumstances and nature of treatment involved.5
In assessing to what extent a minor will be held responsible for
his actions, the supreme court noted that Tennessee case law has
consistently considered the maturity of a minor and his ability to
46. Prince, 321 U.S. at 158.
47. Nixon II, 761 A.2d at 1153. The court identified that familial rights are not beyond
regulation in the public interest as against a claim of religious liberty. Id. Acting to guard its
general interest in a child's well-being, the state may restrict parental controls. Id. This
authority is not nullified merely because the parent grounds his claim to control the child's
conduct in religion or conscience. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1153-55.
51. 724 S.W2d 739 (Tenn. 1987).
52. CardweU, 724 S.W.2d at 742.
53. Id. at 743. Plaintiffs' daughter, a minor of 17 years and 7 months, decided to visit
the defendant physician on her own initiative and without informing her parents. Id. She was
seeking relief from persistent back pain, and the minor's testimony indicated that the
physician did not treat her against her will. Id. The defendant physician testified that
although parental consent is ordinarily obtained for the treatment of minors, the minor
patient's demeanor led him to believe that she was of age, rendering any inquiry about
parental consent unnecessary. Id.
54. Id. at 747.
2001
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 40:147
appreciate the consequences of his own conduct.5 Compatible with
the Rule of Sevens,56 Tennessee tort law has consistently held
minors to differing standards of capacity, depending upon their
ability to appreciate the consequences of their own conduct and
the conduct of others.57  Additionally, the Tennessee court
acknowledged that its state legislature had enacted several statutes
recognizing the varying degrees of responsibility and maturity for
minors aged fourteen years and older.5 Accordingly, the mature
minor exception was accepted as part of the common law of
Tennessee, although it did not alter the general rule requiring
parental consent before providing medical treatment to minors.5
Similarly, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Belcher
v. Charleston Area Medical Center'° also adopted a version of the
mature minor doctrine, and in agreement with the Cardwell
decision, held that the mature minor exception is part of the
common law rule of parental consent in West Virginia.61 Belcher
resolved whether a physician is required to obtain the consent of a
mature minor patient prior to withholding medical treatment.62 The
55. Id. at 748.
56. Id. at 745. The Tennessee Supreme Court identified the Rule of Sevens as the
common law rule for determining questions of capacity for both criminal and tort liability, as
well as the competency of minors to testify as witnesses. Id. The Rule of Sevens asserts that
a minor under the age of seven will be deemed to not have capacity for decision-making;
there will be a rebuttable presumption of no capacity for a minor between seven and
fourteen years of age; and for minors between fourteen and twenty-one years of age, a
rebuttable presumption exists that the minor has capacity. Id.
57. Cardwell, 724 S.W.2d at 747.
58. Id. at 745.
59. Id. at 749. The Tennessee Supreme Court held that the adoption of the mature
minor doctrine as an exception to the common law rule at issue (requiring parental consent
before providing medical treatment to a minor) would be wholly consistent with the existing
statutory and tort law, and continue the normal growth and development of the law. Id. at
748-49. The application of the mature minor doctrine is a question of fact for the jury who
determines if the minor has the capacity to consent to and appreciate the nature, risks, and
consequences of the medical treatment involved. Id. at 749. The court explained that its
decision does not change the general rule requiring parents' consent for the medical
treatment of their minor children by stating:
Under the Rule of Sevens, it would rarely, if ever, be reasonable, absent an applicable
statutory exception, for a physician to treat a minor under seven years of age, and
that between the ages of seven and fourteen, the rebuttable presumption is that a
minor would not have the capacity to consent; moreover, while between the ages of
fourteen and eighteen, a presumption of capacity does arise, that presumption may be
rebutted by evidence of incapacity, thereby exposing a physician or care provider to
an action for battery.
Id.
60. 422 S.E.2d 827 (W. Va 1992).
61. Belcher, 422 S.E.2d at 837.
62.. Id. at 835. Plaintiffs' son, a minor at the age of 17 years and 8 months, was
Commonwealth v. Nixon
West Virginia court held that the mature minor exception applies
not only to medical procedures performed, but also to treatment
administered and withheld.6
The West Virginia Supreme Court, similar to the CardweU court,
had reviewed provisions enacted by the state legislature concerning
medical treatment of minors without parental consent.6r The court
dismissed the defendant physician's assertion that the state's
legislative intent rejected the mature minor rule.65 To the contrary,
the court held that the state statutes did not indicate any legislative
intent to establish a comprehensive statutory scheme occupying the
entire area of the medical treatment of minors.
66
The West Virginia Supreme Court focused on the maturity level
of the minor patient; if the minor is deemed to be a mature minor
based on certain considerations6 7 the child's informed consent is
required before the physician has a legal right to perform a
procedure, administer a treatment, or withhold a treatment from
that minor patient.68 Therefore, the requirement of parental consent
is nullified, and the only necessary informed consent is that of the
mature minor.69
In the case of In re E.G., a Minor,70 Illinois also faced the issue
of applying the mature minor doctrine to determine whether a
minor has a right to refuse medical treatment, and if so, how the
right may be exercised. 71 The general rule in Illinois, similar to that
confined to a wheelchair due to muscular dystrophy. Id. at 829-30. The minor contracted a
viral syndrome, a "cold" in laymen's terms, which had an exaggerated effect on his condition.
Id. at 830. After recurring episodes of breathing failure, the minor was placed on a
respirator. Id. The parents, after consultation with the physician, decided that their minor
child should not be intubated or placed on a respirator again in the event of another
breathing failure, unless specifically requested by the minor. Id. Conversely, the parents
subsequently informed the physician that they did not want their child involved in the
decision. Belcher, 422 S.E.2d at 830. Accordingly, the minor was not consulted and did not
participate in the decision-making process regarding his medical treatment. Id.
63. Id. at 836.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Belcher, 422 S.E.2d at 837.
67. Id. at 838. Determining the child's capacity to consent is a question of fact
dependent upon several factors, including age, ability, experience, education, training, degree
of maturity or judgment obtained by the child, as well as upon the conduct and demeanor of
the child at the time of the procedure or treatment. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. In instances of conflict between the intentions of one or both parents and the
minor, a physician's good faith assessment of the minor's maturity level immunizes the
physician from liability for the failure to obtain parental consent. Id.
70. 549 N.E.2d 322 (1l1. 1989).
71. In re E.G., 549 N.E. 2.d at 324. Appellee E.G., a minor at the age of 17, contracted
2001
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of West Virginia and Tennessee, indicates that a minor does not
reach majority until the age of eighteen. 72 However, the Illinois
Supreme Court recognized that its legislature enacted numerous
statutory exceptions that allow minors, under the age of eighteen,
to exercise certain rights normally associated with adulthood.73
In its analysis, the supreme court acknowledged that an adult
may refuse life-saving blood transfusions based on the freedom of
religion guaranteed by the First Amendment. 74 Furthermore, the
majority rationalized that no reason exists to deny the same right
to control one's health care to mature minors.75 Accordingly, the
Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the common law of Illinois
recognizes that mature minors may possess and exercise rights
regarding their own medical care.
76
Discussing how the mature minor's rights can be exercised, the
Illinois court first confirmed that the trial judge has discretion to
determine whether a minor is mature enough to make his or her
own health care decisions.77 Identifying that Illinois public policy
values the sanctity of life, and that the state has a special duty to
protect those incapable of protecting themselves, the court
indicated that the trial judge must weigh these two principles
against the evidence of a minor's maturity.78 The Supreme Court of
Illinois held that only in instances where clear and convincing
acute nonlymphatic leukemia, a malignant disease of the white blood cells. Id. at 323. The
treatment of the disease required blood transfusions, to which both E.G. and her mother
refused to consent due to their devout religious beliefs as Jehovah's Witnesses. Id. Medical
testimony introduced at the initial hearing in juvenile court opined that without the blood
transfusions, E.G. would likely die within one month. Id. Ultimately, the juvenile court
appointed the counsel of a local hospital as temporary guardian, who in turn authorized the
blood transfusions on E.G.'s behalf. Id. at 324.
72. Id. at 325.
73. Id. For example, a minor over the age of twelve in Illinois can seek medical
treatment without parental consent if believing they have been inflicted with venereal
disease, alcoholism, or drug addiction. Id. In addition, a married or pregnant minor under
the age of eighteen may also consent to medical treatment without parental consent,
therefore controlling his or her own medical decisions. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 326.
76. In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 326.
77. Id. at 327. Noting an exception to this rule, the court declared that if the legislature
has provided applicable statutory guidelines regarding the consent of minors for medical
treatment, these statutory guidelines are determinative. Id.
78. Id. Recognizing that Illinois has a parens patriae power with respect to minors, the
majority explained that this authority is strongest when the minor is immature and thus
incompetent (lacking in capacity) to make these decisions on his own. Id. As the minor gets
older, however, the parens patriae power fades, and eventually disappears once the minor
reaches majority. Id.
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evidence exists to show that the minor is mature enough to
appreciate the consequences of his actions and can exercise adult
judgment will the mature minor doctrine applicable, and thereby
grant the minor the right to consent to or refuse medical
treatment.79
Nonetheless, the Illinois court was quick to clarify that the
common law right to consent to or refuse medical treatment as a
mature minor is not absolute.80 To establish whether the mature
minor doctrine confers a right to consent to or refuse medical
treatment, the supreme court averred that the right of the minor
must be balanced against four state interests: (1) the preservation
of life; (2) protecting the interests of third parties; (3) prevention of
suicide; and (4) maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical
profession.81 Therefore, in a case where a parent or guardian
opposes an unemancipated minor's refusal to consent to treatment
for a life-threatening health problem, such opposition would weigh
heavily against the mature minor's right to refuse treatment.8 2
The case history of Pennsylvania's sister states implies a growing
acceptance of the mature minor doctrine and its application. In
contrast, the limited case history related to the doctrine in
Pennsylvania is contained in Commonwealth v. Cottam.83 One of
the many issues determined by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in
Cottam was whether a child of sufficient maturity and intellect can
assert his own religious identity; and furthermore, if a child of such
sufficient maturity and intellect voluntarily refrains from eating due
to these religious beliefs, do the parents have a duty to provide
food to the child?84
After reviewing the facts, the superior court distinguished
79. Id. at 327-28.
80. Id.
81. In re E.G., 549 N.E. 2.d at 328. With respect to the second stated interest, the court
pronounced the principal interested third parties to be parents, guardians, adult siblings and
relatives. Id.
82. Id. For instance, in E.G.'s case, if E.G. had refused the blood transfusions against
the wishes of her mother, the court would have given serious consideration to the desires of
the mother. Id. Based on religious grounds, both E.G. and her mother agreed that she should
not accept the blood transfusions. Id. See supra note 71. The court held that a mature minor
may exercise the common law right to consent to or refuse to medical treatment in
instances where the mature minor's rights are greater than the related state interests. Id.
83. 616 A-2d 988 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
84. Cottam, 616 A.2d at 1000. Appellant parents were convicted of third degree murder,
recklessly endangering another person (two counts), and endangering the welfare of children
(two counts). Id. at 993. All charges stemmed from the starvation death of their fourteen
year-old son and the malnutrition of their twelve year-old daughter. Id. The children were
not provided with food for a period of six weeks. Id. at 1000.
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between having the maturity to freely exercise one's religious
beliefs, and the maturity necessary to decide from refraining from
eating for forty-two consecutive days.85 The court ruled that even if
the children were considered mature enough to freely exercise
their religious beliefs, the parents are not dispelled of their
affirmative duty to provide the children with parental care,
direction, and sustenance while the children are in their custody. 6
The aforementioned cases examine the concept of the mature
minor doctrine and its application thereof. However, the privacy
interests of a child, as established under the United States and
Pennsylvania Constitutions, can also negate a parent's duty to
provide medical care in certain circumstances. 87 The Pennsylvania
Constitution encompasses the right "to be left alone," and only a
compelling state interest can override one's personal privacy
rights.88
Relying upon the principles set forth in Commonwealth v.
Wormser,89 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Nixon concluded
that a compelling interest in the welfare of minors may impinge
upon the constitutional rights of both minors and adults
simultaneously °  Although conceding that privacy rights are
constitutionally protected, the court ruled that an encroachment
upon this right of privacy was warranted; as the state's parens
patriae interest in the life of an unemancipated child is compelling,
the imposition of a duty to care for a minor in the parents' custody
is an appropriate subject for legislative action.91
In its decision to reject the mature minor doctrine as an available
defense, the majority in Nixon concluded that it is the
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1000. The majority held that parents have an affirmative duty to seek medical
help, despite their religious beliefs, when their child's life is threatened. Id.
87. Nixon II, 761 A.2d at 1156.
88. Id.
89. 103 A. 500 (Pa- 1918). The Wormser court ruled on a case involving the
employment of a sixteen year-old boy at a factory in violation of work-hour guidelines
designed to regulate the employment of minors. Id. The employer argued that child-labor
provisions restricting the time that a minor could work were unconstitutional, and that such
provisions deprived the employer and minor equally of their freedom to contract. Id. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that child-labor statutes were appropriate subjects
for legislative action, and that such statutes were proper under Pennsylvania's authority of
parens patriae. Id. Additionally, the Wormser court identified that the state has an
"inalienable power to enact laws to promote the health, morals and general welfare of the
people," and in doing so, ruled that such child-labor employment regulation was
constitutional. Id.
90. Nixon II, 761 A.2d at 1156.
91. Id. See supra notes 9-11, 27-32 and accompanying text.
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responsibility of the legislature to render decisions and laws
regarding the capacity of minors.92 Although the general rule in
Pennsylvania is that an unemancipated minor cannot give consent
to or refuse medical treatment, several exceptions have been
formalized by the legislature. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
elected not to make any policy decisions regarding the medical
consent requirements for minors, instead abiding to the specific
exceptions and general rules as determined by the legislature.
By not incorporating the mature minor doctrine as a viable
criminal defense for parents, the Nixon majority rejected the
notion that the maturity of an unemancipated child can release a
parent from the affirmative duty of providing care and sustenance.
Under the precedence of the United States Supreme Court in the
Prince93 and Wisconsin v. Yoder9 4 decisions, the Nixon majority's
analysis was accurate. The underlying parental right, as defined by
the U.S. Supreme Court to be the interest in the upbringing of
children, is fundamental;95 only when the decisions of the parent
place the children at physical or mental risk can the government
disrupt this parental right. The guarantee of the fundamental right
to rear children and the duty associated with the care of minor
children under parental custody go hand in hand.
The doctrine of parens patriae also places a burden on the state
to provide oversight of the health and welfare of its citizens,
especially its children.96 Although exceptions exist to discharge the
parental duty and the requirement of parental consent to medical
treatment of a minor, these exceptions were properly made by the
legislature. Furthermore, none of these exceptions were intended to
prove the capacity of a minor to consent to or refuse medical
treatment in a life and death situation.97
The role of the judiciary is to enforce the laws, or strike them
92. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 43, 46 and accompanying text.
94. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). The constitutionality of a Wisconsin statute requiring
compulsory school attendance of all children, including the Amish, was challenged. Yoder,
406 U.S. at 207. The Amish claimed that mandating Amish children to attend school through
the age of sixteen was unconstitutional due to their religious beliefs. Id. at 211.
95. Id. at 233. In Yoder, the U.S. Supreme Court indicated that parents have the
primary duty to rear and educate their children. Id. However, the Court concluded that this
conferral of parental power can be limited in instances where the parental decision making
put the minor child's health or safety at risk. Id. The Amish introduced compelling evidence
that "accommodating their religious objections to the compulsory additional year(s) of
education would not impair the physical or mental health of the child." Id. at 234.
96. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
97. Nixon II, 761 A.2d at 1155.
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down if found to be unconstitutional. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court analyzed the case accurately, as the acceptance of the
mature minor doctrine in allowing minors to exercise their own
religious beliefs to their detriment would be contrary to the state's
parens patriae responsibility, as well as exceed the scope of the
court's intended judicial function.
Douglas C. Hart
